JALS ACADÊMICO (Jose Adercio): Limites de direitos fundamentais

As a nation that values and guarantees religious freedom, the United States is often faced with questions regarding the public display of religious symbols. Such questions have arisen in a number of Supreme Court cases, involving both Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause issues. Since 1984, the Court has considered the constitutionality of the display of religious symbols such as a creche, a menorah, and a cross in public areas. The Court has also considered the constitutionality of Air Force regulations that prohibited a clinical psychologist from wearing a yarmulke. Parallel to the Supreme Court cases, a number of federal and state courts have been faced with cases involving the display of religious symbols in the courtroom. These cases also include Establishment Clause issues, relating to a court's display of symbols such as the Ten Commandments, as well as Free Exercise Clause issues, involving the rights of parties, witnesses, and attorneys to dress in religious garb in the courtroom. At the same time, these courts have often considered the potential for juror prejudice that may result from the display of religious symbols in the courtroom. Levine surveys and analyzes the decisions courts have reached in addressing these issues. Part I of the Article discusses the rights of parties to wear religious garb in the courtroom. Despite some notable exceptions, most courts have protected this right, finding that it would not unduly interfere with courtroom decorum or improperly prejudice a jury. Part II observes that, in contrast, courts have not been as willing to protect the rights of witnesses and attorneys to dress in religious garb in the courtroom. Part III discusses the display of religious symbols in courtrooms, and the different approaches courts have employed in considering this issue, in light of Establishment Clause questions as well as potential juror prejudice. This Article concludes with the hope that courts will have the wisdom to issue judgments that carefully balance the competing interests in a way that protects both the value of religious freedom and the values of fairness and equality

Leia na íntegra: Religious Symbols and Religious Garb in the Courtroom: Personal Values and Public Judgments (Samuel J. Levine)

A experiência alemã

As part of the current debate in Australia on the adoption of a bill or charter of rights, the experience of other countries is informative. The German Constitution contains a comprehensive catalogue of rights and freedoms. This includes principles protecting religious freedom, most importantly article 4, which declares ‘inviolable’ the ‘freedom of faith, of conscience, and freedom to profess a religion or a particular philosophy’. It also guarantees the ‘undisturbed practice of religion’. Should Australia opt to adopt a charter of rights in any form, it is highly likely that this instrument will contain some protection of cultural and religious freedom. While initially an Australian charter would not be constitutionally entrenched, a comparison with Germany is still helpful because it can be expected that issues encountered under a constitutional charter also arise under a legislative one. The German experience provides examples of the type of social controversies which the courts are called on to decide in relation to the protection of religious freedom.

Issues encountered in Germany seem to belong to two broad categories: first, which kind of behaviour falls within the ambit of freedom of religion and, secondly, to what degree can religious freedom be limited. In relation to the first category, it appears uncontroversial that practices such as praying, conducting Sunday service or ringing of church bells constitute religious behaviour. But what about announcing a charitable drive to collect second hand goods from the pulpit; selling food or drink at religious meetings or refusing to bury an urn in a cemetery? In relation to the second category, even if a type of behaviour is found to be within the definition of freedom of belief, there must be limitations to this freedom. But where should the line be drawn? In the last few decades, the German Constitutional Court was called upon to rule on controversies where one party’s freedom to exercise his or her religion infringed another party’s freedom not to be exposed to religion or religious practices. Many of these occurred within the educational system. Famous examples are the School Prayer Case, where a student’s parents objected to their child’s exposure to school prayer outside of religious education; the Classroom Crucifix Case, where non-Christian parents objected to their child being exposed to crucifixes in classrooms of a public, non-religious school; and the Teacher Headscarf Case where the Court was asked to decide whether an Islamic teacher is entitled to wear a headscarf while teaching in a public school, thus exposing students to a manifestation of her faith. All of these cases saw the Constitutional Court become involved in morally highly controversial disputes, which received a lot of attention from the public and where public opinion was clearly divided. This paper will explain the course which the Court took in resolving these disputes. It will argue that a clause protecting freedom of belief in a charter of rights inevitably involves the courts in disputes which are morally difficult, highly controversial and the subject of much public debate. However, in my view, this is a small price to pay for providing protection of the public’s religious beliefs in a charter of rights.

Leia na íntegra: Classroom Crucifixes, Teacher Headscarves, Faith Healers and More - The German Experience of Religious Freedom Under a Bill of Rights(Cornelia Koch)

Liberdade religiosa e cuidados médicos

Cirugía y transfusión urgente en el paciente testigo de Jehová: revisión de las implicacionesmédico-legales

Frecuentemente, en nuestra actividad médica, aparece una situación de conflicto entre dos valores jurídicos fundamentales, como son la vida y la libertad. Existen decisiones y autos contradictorios a lo largo de la jurisprudencia a la hora de anteponer por un lado la vida del enfermo (y, por lo tanto, la lex artis del profesional médico) a la libertad del paciente testigode Jehová para rechazar las transfusiones de hemoderivados. Si bien, en principio, el derecho a la vida se antepone a la autonomía del enfermo porque el facultativo asume, en función de su ética profesional, el deber de intentar la curación. De esta forma se infringe la libertad del paciente, y puede dar lugar a actuaciones que pueden ser susceptibles de reclamaciones y responsabilidades jurídicas. Por ello, realizamos un planteamiento general de todas y cada una de las posibles situaciones capaces de generar dudas, además de un análisis de la jurisprudencia y la posibleresponsabilidad derivada de nuestras decisiones.

Liberdade religiosa: limites

LIMITES DE LA LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA Y LAS RELACIONES PERSONALES DE UN PADRE CON SUS HIJOS (Comentario de la STC 141/2000, de 29 de mayo). Francisco R. Hernández

SUMARIO: I. INTRODUCCIÓN. II. LA SENTENCIA DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL 141/2000, DE 29 DE MAYO. 2. Antecedentes.La sentencia de la Audiencia Provincial de Valencia. A) Fase jurisdiccional. B) Recurso de amparo. Posición jurídica de las partes personadas. 2. Argumentación sustancial de la STC 141/2000. III. PROBLEMAS PLANTEADOS POR LA SENTENCIA QUE COMENTO. CUESTIONES QUE PARECEN PERTINENTE ABORDAR AQUÍ. IV. EL DERECHO DE LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA Y SUS LIMITES. 1. El derecho de libertad de creencia, en general. Sus límites. 2. El derecho de los menores a la libertad religiosa. Alcance y ejercicio. 3. ¿Se ha salvaguardado el derecho de libertad religiosa de los menores en el caso de autos? V. EL INTERÉS DEL MENOR, EN GENERAL, Y EN MATERIA DE LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA. 2. Argumentación de la sentencia a este respecto. 2. El interés del menor, en general. Dificultad de su determinación. 3. En qué consiste, efectivamente, el interés de los menores. 4. Dificultad de la determinación in concreto del interés del menor. 5. El interés del menor en materia religiosa. VI. LAS RELACIONES PERSONALES ENTRE PADRES E HIJOS. 2. Fundamento y finalidad del derecho de visita y relaciones -personales. 2. Naturaleza del derecho de visita. 3. Limitabilidad de las relaciones personales padres-hijos menores. VII. A MODO DE CONCLUSIÓN.